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UNIFYING COMMERCIAL LAW IN THE NEW CENTURY

LANCE LIEBMAN*

I join enthusiastically in the applause for Fred Miller's service as
Executive Director of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL). Without question, Fred is the
outstanding contemporary embodiment of the passion that led fifty years
ago to the achievement of a uniform commercial law among the
American states. His work serves a worthy cause, and the American
Law Institute (ALI) is proud to have been a partner in the venture and to
have played its appropriate instruments in the orchestra that Fred has
been conducting.
That said, and Fred's integrity, intelligence, and steadfastness
appropriately noted, it is also the case that the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) religion has today more different sects, doctrines, and
perhaps even heresies than the orthodox faith that Fred has so ably
shepherded.
I wrote about this one year ago, 1 and the events of the past twelve
months have confirmed some of my intuitions and generated other
deviant speculations.
I. LOBBYING BY SPECIAL INTERESTS

In modern conditions, statutory law cannot be revised without
awareness that organized interests will fight fiercely for their
preferences. The original UCC was the law of merchants and banks.
The consumer movement alone requires accommodation among
legitimate but incompatible positions. For one among hundreds of other
examples, see the differences of view between those who "own"
intellectual property (for example, software) and those who consume it
(for example, insurance companies who "lease" computer programs and
librarians who make them available to their "borrowers"). As Robert
* Lance Liebman is William S. Heinecke Professor of Law at Columbia University
and Director of the American Law Institute.
1. See generally, Lance Liebman, Symposium, The ALI and theUCC, 52 HASTINGS
L.J. 645 (2001).
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Scott and Alan Schwartz predicted,2 large institutional lenders turned out
to be strong enough to succeed quickly with the new Article 9, but
differences among competing organized groups have so far halted what
started out to be Article 2B of the UCC and ended as a freestanding
Uniform Computer Information Transactions Act (UCIT A), and even
Article 2.

IL NEW TECHNOLOGY
Fast-changing technology is a problem. The economic transactions
governed by the original code were reasonably stable and understood.
When electronic banking occurred, drafting new law proved difficult.
Computer technology seems complex and dynamic. In truth, the transfer
of a computer, a computer program, or a "smart" good is little different
from the sale (or lease) of a lawn mower or an automobile. For example,
think about three of the topics on which Karl Llewellyn is regarded as
having made major intellectual strides. One is the question of a
contracting party's knowledge, and the matter of whether all important
terms are communicated or available before an agreement is reached.
Another is the relevance of business practice as legislatures and judges
craft law. And a third is the attempt to distinguish legal doctrines that
function as default rules from those that cannot be waived by agreement.
These are hard questions to be sure. But it is difficult to see why one
would come to different conclusions about them depending on whether
one is thinking about the cooling work of the refrigerator or about the
computer embedded in the refrigerator or indeed about the software
package that a user pays for by credit card and then downloads from the
Internet. But the apparent complexity and newness of computer software
and related new forms of "information" have allowed those who make
these products to argue (successfully, up to a point) for exemption from
some of the responsibilities with which those who sell "old" goods have
long lived. The one true difference is that some goods now are or
contain intellectual property. The buyer of a washing machine never
obtained the right to violate the patent of the seller, and the buyer of a
Coke™ could not violate the seller's trademark. It is a challenge to draft
statutory language to govern the transaction itself within the limits set by
laws of intellectual property that the transferor is entitled to impose on
the transferee. When that is attempted in a statute (such as today's
2. See, Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private
Legislature, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 595,647 (1995).
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UCIT A) separate from the one that regulates the associated good (the
refrigerator with a computer and computer program, or the laptop
computer that comes with software), then the two statutes need
sophisticated and coordinated "scope" language to delineate correctly the
full law of the transaction. So far, that effort has defeated the uniform
law process. This was a smaller problem when the "good" was a CocaCola™ or a Whirlpool™ washing machine. With electronically movable
intellectual property, the owner's rights in the words, music, or data can
be infringed readily and globally. This property, so high in potential
value and yet so evanescent, forces hard questions about statutory
protection.
Ill. LEAVE IT TO THE COURTS

This leads to the heretical thought that it may be too soon to affix
this area of law in a uniform statute. Why not let the law develop
through the evolution of judge-made doctrine? One reason for the
absence of passion on behalf of the latest amendments to Article 2,
diligent and intelligent as the two drafting committees and the three
reporters have been over the past decade, is that many hard issues have
been finessed, and therefore left to the courts. The work of the judges on
the new questions presented by the latest technology has by and large
been sound. Indeed, it would be hard to disagree with the conclusion
that courts have done their job much more satisfactorily than the uniform
law ·process. As of today, it appears that we will let the courts continue
this work-either by halting the process of Article 2 amendments, thus
keeping the UCC where Llewellyn put it, or by amending Article 2 with
the old scope language or with new language sufficiently open-ended to
encourage the courts to continue the evolution of judge-made doctrine.
IV. GLOBALIZATION

Finally, as to some of these issues, the day of state law will soon be
over.
If we truly need national uniformity-and in the virtual
marketplace for software and intangible information there may be such
need-then Congress must act. But for the next period of newtechnology law, even the United States is only one jurisdiction. Note
that the Framers, so long ago, assigned protection of intellectual property
to the national government. Note also that the United States has behaved
for the past decade as if it must bring its law of intellectual property into
alignment with European and, indeed, world trends. Also, certain issues
of property, privacy, and even free speech will inevitably migrate to
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transnational fora, where only the national government can speak
effectively for our federal republic.
None of these predictions diminishes the value or the quality of the
effort that Fred Miller has been leading and will continue to lead. But
after fifty years of essentially a single process of ALI and NCCUSL
partnership in the UCC, I suspect there will now come into existence
new ways in which the concerns of companies, consumers, professors,
and thoughtful lawyers are heard in the formulation of American policy
and in the decisions made by international institutions. We must find
ways to assure that the values that NCCUSL and the ALI have brought
(and will continue to bring) to the UCC process are transplanted to the
new fora. And indeed I am reasonably confident that both of these
venerable and evolving organizations will have a significant role as new
procedures develop.

